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Introduction	
  
Officially, there is no such thing as “proportionality review” in American administrative
law. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, the framework statute governing
administrative law, does not recognize proportionality as a general head of review. Nor
have American courts ever developed a judge-made doctrine of proportionality as such,
either prior to or following the APA’s enactment. While the immense scholarly literature
on proportionality continues to grow by leaps and bounds, virtually nothing has been
written about proportionality in American administrative law, no doubt in part because it
is assumed there is nothing to write.2

1

Assistant Professor of Law, Penn State Law. Thanks to Jamison Colburn, Paul Craig,
William Fox, Arden Rowell, Jamelle Sharpe, Takis Tridimas, and Chris Walker for
helpful comments and conversations, and to Rebecca Buckley-Stein for excellent
research assistance.
2
Perhaps the closest thing is historical scholarship on nineteenth-century understandings
of the states’ police power. William Novak’s important book has shown how state police
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Why, then, include a chapter about the United States in a book about proportionality
review in administrative law? In lieu of proportionality, American administrative law
features a congeries of doctrines that courts deploy to evaluate agency exercises of
discretion under different circumstances, in ways described in detail below. In some
respects, these frameworks for review resemble proportionality in operation, but there are
also notable differences. For these reasons, the contrast between proportionality review
and American approaches to the review of discretion is potentially illuminating,
highlighting what may be distinctive features of both.3
Looking at the doctrines governing judicial review of administrative discretion in the
United States, three features stand out. First, American judicial review is characterized by
a high degree of unpredictability. Of course, law is rarely perfectly predictable, but I
would contend that judicial review of discretion is in a special class. Not only is it often
powers could curb private property rights and other private interests, under conditions of
“necessity.” See William J Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in
Nineteenth-Century America (University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
3
In some respects, the closest analogue to proportionality analysis in American
administrative law is in the regulatory review process, which is carried out not by courts,
but within the executive branch. Early in his first term, President Ronald Reagan issued
an executive order instructing agencies, to the extent permitted by law, to undertake
regulatory action only when “the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh
the potential costs;” to choose objectives “to maximize the net benefits to society;” and
when considering alternative approaches to an objective, to choose the one “involving the
least net cost to society.” Exec Order No 12291, 46 Fed Reg 13193. For major rules, the
order further requires agencies to submit to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), which is located within the Executive Office of the President, a
regulatory impact analysis that demonstrates the rule’s cost-benefit justification and its
superiority to alternatives. President Reagan’s successors have continued regulatory
review but tweaked it, broadening the set of values that agencies should consider in their
analysis to include equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts. Thus, at the
behest of the White House, agencies themselves now are expected to conduct a sort of
proportionality review in-house. But because this volume focuses on proportionality
review of administrative action as practiced by courts, regulatory review falls outside of
the scope of this chapter.
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difficult to predict the outcome of judicial review in particular cases, but the uncertainty
runs deeper. In a considerable number of cases, there is substantial uncertainty even as to
what framework of review the court will apply, and even when it is nominally clear
which standard governs, there often remains substantial uncertainty over what kind of
analysis the court will perform, and how intensively it will scrutinize the challenged
agency action.
The second point speaks directly to a contrast with proportionality. Classical
proportionality review is designed to detect and correct a particular kind of administrative
failure: an overreach, in which the government uses measures that are excessive in
relation to the ends they are designed to achieve. Judicial control of discretion in
American administrative law is more symmetrical, in that the agency is required to
explain its actions whether the claim is that they go too far, or that they do not go far
enough. However, as described further below, there are countervailing doctrines in
American administrative law that make judicial redress more likely for agency failures of
commission than for failures of omission.
Third, reviewing courts in American administrative law tend to “proceduralize”
substantive review, focusing more on the agency’s failures to throughly ventilate the
relevant issues than the merits of the agency’s conclusions.4 The end result may often be
the same, in terms of what agency actions are blocked. But proceduralizing substantive
review may have other consequences, both for the burdens agencies face before
reviewing courts (which may be more substantial), and for the ultimate ability of agencies
to realize favored policy options (which may be greater).
This chapter develops these points in the course of a discussion of the judicial review of
agency exercises of discretion under American administrative law. The next section sets
4

Jerry L Mashaw and David L Harfst, ‘Regulation and Legal Culture: the Case of Motor
Vehicle Safety’ (1986) 4 Yale J on Reg 257.
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the stage for that discussion by sketching the doctrinal lay of the land. The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) looms large here, as this statute defines the basic
categories of agency action and the standards of judicial review. The APA makes review
broadly available, but a number of exceptions, both statutory and judge-made, shield
much of what agencies do from the scrutiny of courts. When review is available, the
scope of review under the APA may turn on a series of distinctions: whether the agency
acts through adjudication or rulemaking; whether it uses formal or informal procedures;
and whether the challenge addresses a determination of fact, law, or policy.
The following section focuses sustained attention on the review standard most closely
associated with agency discretion: arbitrary and capricious review. I work in detail
through the reasoning employed in three important arbitrary and capricious review cases,
decided over a span of almost forty years: National Tire Dealers and Retreaders v.
Brinegar, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., and FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. The detailed analyses of these
cases build a platform for considering both how arbitrary and capricious review may be
changing, and for ways in which it is similar to and different from proportionality review.
Agencies also exercise significant discretion in the course of interpreting the statutes they
administer, and the penultimate section of the chapter considers how courts review
agency interpretations of statutes. In spite of judicial and scholarly engagement with this
topic, this section shows that it is not entirely clear how the standards of review employed
in this context relate to arbitrary and capricious review. A brief, final section concludes.

Judicial	
  Review	
  in	
  American	
  Administrative	
  Law:	
  An	
  Overview	
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Although all American states have their own agencies that are also subject to judicial
review, this chapter concerns federal administrative law exclusively.5 The focus here is
squarely on the federal Administrative Procedure Act, which lays out the default rules of
administrative law, although Congress can dictate agency-specific alternatives by
statute.6 The APA lays out both the procedures that agencies must follow in carrying out
their mandates under the statutes that they administer, and the standards that courts apply
in reviewing agency action. The courts that review administrative actions in the United
States are ordinary federal courts, as opposed to specialized administrative tribunals.

The	
  Availability	
  of	
  Review	
  	
  
The APA contains generous provisions for judicial review, accompanied by generous
exceptions. First, the APA defines “agency” broadly to include “each authority of the
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by
another agency,” except for Congress, the courts, territorial governments, and a few other
exceptions.7 The APA further provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject
to judicial review.”8 Courts have read this provision to establish a general presumption
5

The majority of states have adopted or been influenced by model administrative
procedure acts that resemble the APA in important respects. Arthur Earl Bonfield, ‘The
Federal APA and State Administrative Law’ (1986) 72 Va L Rev 297; Ronald M Levin,
‘Rulemaking Under the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act’ (2010) 20
Widener LJ 855.
6
See, for instance, Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 USC § 655(f) (providing that
substantial evidence review, rather than the APA default of arbitrary and capricious
review, will apply to health and safety rules promulgated by the Occupational Safety and
Health Commission).
7
5 USC §§ 551(1) (defining agencies for purposes of the APA’s requirements), 701(b)
(defining agencies for purposes of judicial review). The Supreme Court has also held that
the President does not qualify as an agency for purposes of the APA. Franklin v
Massachusetts, 505 US 788, 801 (1992).
8
5 USC § 704.
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that final agency action is subject to judicial review.9 “Agency action,” in turn, is defined
in expansive terms, to include “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.”10 Notably, this
provision extends judicial review to include agency rules, which are the chief instruments
of agency policymaking. In principle, then, the APA empowers courts to sit in judgment
over agency policy choices and the design of regulatory programs, to a degree that
administrative lawyers in other legal systems might find surprising.11
The APA is also generous in granting rights to initiate judicial review. A different
provision of the APA permits any person “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute” to initiate judicial review.12
However, judicial review is not as widely available as a quick read of the APA might
suggest. First, as already noted, the APA is only a default statute, and it recognizes that
an agency’s organic statute may preclude judicial review entirely (although few do).13
Second, the APA expressly precludes review to the extent that “agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law.”14 The question inevitably follows: what does it
mean for agency action to be “committed to agency discretion by law”? In Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, the Supreme Court approvingly quoted the legislative history of
the APA for the proposition that the exception covers “those rare instances where

9

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971). See also Nicholas
Bagley ‘The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability’ (2014) 127 Harv L Rev 1285
(challenging the presumption).
10
5 USC § 551(13).
11
Susan Rose-Ackerman Controlling Environmental Policy: the Limits of Public Law in
Germany and the United States (Yale University Press, 1995).
12
5 USC § 702.
13
5 USC § 701(a)(1).
14
5 USC § 701(a)(2).
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‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’”15
For instance, the National Security Act provided that the Director of the CIA “may, in his
discretion, terminate employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he
shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of the United States.”16
Finding that the language “fairly exudes deference to the Director,” the Supreme Court in
1988 held that the decision to fire a covert electronics technician on account of his sexual
orientation was committed to the agency’s discretion, and hence unreviewable, except
insofar as it was the basis for constitutional claims.17
Although the “committed to agency discretion” exception permits relatively few agency
actions to evade judicial review, its greater impact may be blocking review of agency
inaction. The Supreme Court has analogized agency discretion over bringing
enforcement actions to prosecutorial discretion, and found “a general presumption of
unreviewability of decisions not to enforce.”18 For instance, executions by lethal
injections in the United States are carried out using drugs that are regulated by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA). Death row inmates petitioned the FDA to investigate
the use of these drugs in executions as the “unapproved use of an approved drug” in
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, which the FDA administered.
The agency declined to do so, and the inmates sued. The Supreme Court found for the
agency, holding that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through
civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute
discretion.”19 An agency, with finite resources for enforcement, must make choices about
how to deploy them, and these choices “often involve[] a complicated balancing of a

15

Overton Park (n 9) 410 (quoting S Rep No 752, 79th Cong, 1st Sess, 26) (1945).
50 USC § 403(c) (1988).
17
Webster v Doe, 486 US 592 (1988). Justice Scalia, in dissent, proposed a broader
reading of the exception, which would encompass the pre-APA “common law” of
unreviewable executive discretion. ibid 608-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18
Heckler v Chaney, 470 US 821 (1985).
19
ibid 831.
16
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number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.”20 The matter is different
when a statute mandates certain enforcement actions.
Moreover, the requirement that agency action be “final” means that even consequential
agency actions can be shielded from review altogether where agency choices are given
legal effect by other governmental actors. For instance, in Dalton v. Specter,21 the
Supreme Court found the Secretary of Defense’s order to close the Philadelphia Naval
Shipyard unreviewable. Under the governing statute, a commission with input from
military leaders makes recommendations to the President on which military bases should
be closed or realigned, and the President must either accept or reject the commission’s
recommendations in their entirety. Petitioners alleged procedural and substantive
problems with the commission’s work as well as actions of the Secretaries of the Navy
and Defense. The Supreme Court, however, found the decision to close the base
unreviewable. The commission’s recommendations did not constitute a final agency
action, since they lacked legal effect before the President acted on them, and the
President’s endorsement of the recommendations was not subject to review, because the
President is not an agency within the meaning of the APA.
In addition, notwithstanding the APA’s statement that a “failure to act” is reviewable,
judicial restrictions on what kinds of failures to act are reviewable have come close to
rendering this provision a dead letter. In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, an
environmental group sought to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
failure to take steps to protect a Wilderness Study Area against environmental
degradation, as required by federal law.22 The Supreme Court turned back the challenge
without reaching its merits, holding that the only failures to act made reviewable by the
APA are failures to take a discrete agency action that is mandated by law.
20

ibid.
511 US 462 (1994).
22
542 US 54 (2002).
21
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Furthermore, broad exceptions from the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures for
military and foreign affairs functions, interpretative rules, general statements of policy,
and other matters where the agency finds “good cause” decreases the potency of judicial
review where they apply by exempting agency activity from the procedural standards that
agencies would otherwise have to observe.23 Moreover, agencies may be able to delay
review or evade it entirely by using interpretative rules, guidance documents, and policy
statements to make consequential policy choices. So-called “nonlegislative” rules are
generally subject only to collateral challenge incident to agency enforcement actions
against regulated parties. To the extent nonlegislative rules favor regulated parties, or
their in terrorem effect induces compliance, they will not face judicial review at all. 24
Lastly, as discussed further below, restrictive judicial rulings on who has standing to
bring suit in federal court as a constitutional matter have undercut somewhat the APA’s
broad provisions for access to judicial review.

The	
  Scope	
  of	
  Review	
  
If the rules governing the availability of judicial review in American administrative law
are somewhat difficult to navigate, the same can be said of the scope of review.
According to the Attorney General’s Manual to the Administrative Procedure Act, long
considered the most reliable contemporaneous guide to the intentions of the statute’s
drafters, the APA was meant to restate and codify existing practices with respect to the
scope of judicial review.25 Prior to the enactment of the APA, judges had developed a
variety of standards for reviewing administrative actions, including abuse of discretion,
arbitrary and capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence. Given that these
23

5 USC § 553(a)(1), (b)(3)-(4).
David L Franklin, ‘Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short
Cut,’ (2010) 120 Yale LJ 276.
25
Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) 108.
24
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standards of review had been developed piecemeal by different courts over a period of
years, it is no surprise that, in the words of some leading scholars, “§ 706 [the scope of
review section] is not a model of linguistic clarity or coherence.”26
Which framework for review applies may depend on the form of agency action at issue,
the level of procedural formality involved, and also the nature of the agency
determination that is being contested. With respect to the form of agency action, the APA
generally requires agencies to act through one of two processes: adjudication and
rulemaking. The APA also establishes two levels of procedural formality—formal, a.k.a.
“on-the-record,” and informal—that statutes may require agencies to observe.
On-the-record adjudications resemble trials, complete with an impartial decision maker
presiding, the presentation of evidence, and opportunities for the direct and crossexamination of witnesses. On-the-record adjudications are typically employed to decide
individual claims within a statutory framework administered by an agency. So, for
instance, individuals’ applications for disability benefits and foreign nationals’ petitions
for asylum are both handled through formal adjudications, conducted by the Social
Security Administration and the Executive Office of Immigration Review, respectively.
Agencies also tend to use formal adjudications when they put individuals or entities “on
trial” for statutory violations, as when the Federal Trade Commission brings charges
against a business for using unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
Rulemakings paradigmatically involve the formation of agency policy, rather than the
resolution of individual claims or charges. The APA contemplates that rules will have
prospective effect and “implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”27 When the
EPA promulgates national ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act, for
26

Ronald A Cass and others, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (6th edn, Aspen
2011) 113.
27
5 USC § 551(4).
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instance, it does so by making a rule. In contrast to adjudications, rulemakings are more
often conducted using informal procedures, which dispense with the trappings of a trial,
but afford public notice of the agency’s plans and an opportunity for interested
individuals to comment (hence, “notice-and-comment rulemaking”).28
A further set of distinctions can be drawn between agency actions that involve
determinations on matters of fact, matters of law, and matters of policy or discretion. The
fact that the compartments dividing issues of fact, law, and policy are by no means
watertight has not stopped Congress and the courts from outlining and elaborating
judicial review doctrines that rely on these distinctions.29 Although adjudication is
modeled on judicial trials and rulemaking is modeled on the legislative process, as a
practical matter, either process can involve all these types of determinations.
Putting the pieces together now, what framework courts use to review an administrative
action may depend on (1) the process used (rulemaking or adjudication), (2) the level of
formality (formal or informal), and (3) the kind of agency determination at issue (fact,
law, or policy). For instance, the APA specifies that factual findings made in on-therecord proceedings are subject to “substantial evidence” review. In other words, they will
be upheld unless the reviewing court finds them to be “unsupported by substantial
evidence” in the record as a whole.30 As a practical matter, these on-the-record
proceedings are almost always adjudications.31

28

While these generalizations about the uses of adjudication and rulemaking generally
hold, they are not ironclad. The Supreme Court has ruled that agencies with authority to
conduct both rulemakings and adjudications can use either to make policy, and the
National Labor Relations Board in particular has historically favored the use of
adjudication as a policymaking tool. See NLRB v Wyman-Gordon Co, 394 US 759
(1969).
29
Christopher Edley, Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy
(Yale UP 1992).
30
5 USC 70(2)(E). See also Universal Camera Corp v NLRB, 340 US 474 (1951)
(making clear, in the context of the similarly worded scope of review provision of the
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With respect to legal questions, the APA provides that “the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.”32 In
fact, when reviewing agency actions courts have never decided all questions of law de
novo, but have instead devised a number of deference formulas, some of which are
discussed further below. The APA also seems to contemplate some de novo judicial factfinding: it commands the reviewing court to set aside agency action “unwarranted by the
facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”33
Commentators have differed on whether courts should resort to de novo review of facts
when the agency has compiled no record,34 but in any event, the Supreme Court has
given a narrow construction to the de novo review provision.35
Most relevant for present purposes is the provision of the APA that permits courts to hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”36 This
provision governs agency determinations that are neither questions or law nor questions
of fact decided in on-the-record proceedings, and so sweep in the bulk of agency
National Labor Relations Act, that the substantiality of evidence must be determined on
the basis of the record as a whole).
31
On-the-record rulemakings are notoriously inefficient policymaking tools. An
egregious and oft-cited example is the FDA rulemaking to determine the minimum
peanut content of peanut butter, which lasted nine years and produced a transcript 7,736
pages long. Robert W Hamilton, ‘Rulemaking on a Record By the Food and Drug
Administration’ (1972) 50 Tex L Rev 1132, 1143-45.
32
5 USC § 704.
33
5 USC § 706(2)(D).
34
Compare Nathaniel L Nathanson, ‘Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing
Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and
Other Federal Statutes,’ (1975) 75 Colum L Rev 721 (supporting de novo review in this
circumstance), with Stephanie Hoffer and Christopher J Walker, ‘The Death of Tax Court
Exceptionalism,’ (forthcoming 2015) 99 Minn L Rev (urging remand to the agency to
produce a record).
35
Overton Park (n 9) 415.
36
5 USC § 706(2)(A).
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discretionary decisions, including “informal adjudications”: the countless, run-of-the-mill
agency decisions that are neither rule makings nor formal adjudications.37 The next
section is devoted to an examination of arbitrary and capricious review.38

Arbitrary	
  and	
  Capricious	
  Review	
  
Drawing on the language of older judicial opinions, the APA permits courts to set aside
actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law,” but courts have never taken pains to distinguish among the various
grounds for reversal listed in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Instead, courts characteristically refer
to “arbitrary and capricious” review as a single standard. In three respects, arbitrary and
capricious review probably occupies the position in American administrative law closest
to the position occupied by proportionality review in some other administrative law
systems.
First, while arbitrary and capricious review is not exactly a general head of review in
American administrative law, it is something very close.39 Although certain kinds of
agency decisions are subject to different standards of review—as noted above, for
37

Overton Park (n 9) 410.
The APA also establishes other heads of review that are of great importance to
administrative law, but limited relevance to judicial control of agency discretion.
Specifically, reviewing courts have the power to set aside agency actions that are
unconstitutional (5 USC § 706(2)(B)), ultra vires (§ 706(2)(C)), or procedurally defective
(§ 706(2)(D)).
39
Proportionality is a general criterion of review in EU law, see Takis Tridimas, The
General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 132, and in German Polizei- und
Ordungsrecht, a body of law dealing not only with the police, but the regulation of
threats to public welfare more generally, see Volkmar Götz, Allgemeines Polizei- Und
Ordnungsrecht: Ein Studienbuch (15th edn, CH Beck 2012) 129-30. A debate continues
in England over whether proportionality should be treated as a general head of review in
administrative law. See Paul Craig, Administrative Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell
2012) 668-75.
38
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instance, on-the-record factual determinations are reviewed under the substantial
evidence standard—in the words of then-Judge Scalia, arbitrary and capricious review “is
a catchall, picking up administrative misconduct not covered by the other more specific
paragraphs.”40 Also, because “[t]he ‘scope of review’ provisions of the APA . . . are
cumulative,” every agency action subject to judicial review must satisfy the arbitrary and
capricious standard, whatever other tests it might have to survive.
Second, arbitrary and capricious review applies to much of the discretionary
decisionmaking of agencies. Other scope of review provisions on the APA govern
questions of fact (in on-the-record proceedings) and questions of law. Arbitrary and
capricious review covers what is left over. While acknowledging again the imprecision of
the fact-law-policy distinction, a good part of the agency decisions that raise neither
issues of fact nor issues of law could plausibly be described as policy choices, or as
exercises of agency discretion.
Third and finally, unlike the other bases of review recognized in § 706, arbitrary and
capricious review authorizes courts to evaluate and overturn agency actions on the basis
of their substance, as opposed to procedural shortcomings,41 jurisdictional overreaching,42
or lack of conformity with the Constitution.43 Arbitrary and capricious review is a form
of merits review, in which the policy choice made the agency is evaluated on its merits.44
However, as discussed below, there is a strong tendency in American administrative law,

40

Ass’n of Data Processing Serv Orgs, Inc v Bd of Governors of the Fed Reserve Sys,
745 F 2d 677, 683 (DC Cir 1984).
41
5 USC § 706(2)(B).
42
5 USC § 706(2)(C).
43
5 USC § 706(2)(D).
44
On merits review, which is a central organizing category of Australian administrative
law in particular, see Peter Cane, ‘Judicial Review and Merits Review: Comparing
Administrative Adjudication By Courts and Tribunals’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman and
Peter L Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2010) 426.
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even in arbitrary and capricious review, to describe problems with agency policy choices
in terms of procedural failings.

The	
  Advent	
  of	
  “Hard	
  Look”	
  Review	
  
Exactly what is “arbitrary and capricious” review? Its meaning has evolved over time,
and even now, it remains something of a moving target. This section recounts its origins,
and then explores in some depth its use in three cases—National Tire Dealers and
Retreaders v. Brinegar, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., and FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.—to illustrate the
varied modes of analysis that modern arbitrary and capricious review can entail.
At the time the APA was enacted, arbitrary and capricious review was understood to be
highly deferential to agency exercises of discretion. Arbitrary and capricious review was
animated by the same spirit of deference to the policy choices of non-judicial actors as
the “rational basis” review of legislation.45 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,46
an important pre-APA Supreme Court case, illustrates the point. In that case, the NBC
broadcasting network brought a number of challenges to radio regulations promulgated
by the Federal Communications Commission. After dispensing with the petitioners’
claims that the agency had exceeded its authority under the governing statute, the Court
turned to their argument that the regulations were nonetheless unlawful with the
following words:
The Regulations are assailed as “arbitrary and capricious”. If this
contention means that the Regulations are unwise, that they are not likely
to succeed in accomplishing what the Commission intended, we can say
only that the appellants have selected the wrong forum for such a plea.
45

See Wickard v Fillburn, 317 US 111, 129-130 (turning back a challenge to the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as arbitrary and capricious).
46
319 US 190 (1943).
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What was said in Board of Trade v. United States is relevant here: “We
certainly have neither technical competence nor legal authority to
pronounce upon the wisdom of the course taken by the Commission.” Our
duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was
based upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to
authority granted by Congress. It is not for us to say that the “public
interest” will be furthered or retarded by the Chain Broadcasting
Regulations. The responsibility belongs to the Congress for the grant of
valid legislative authority and to the Commission for its exercise. . . . If
time and changing circumstances reveal that the “public interest” is not
served by application of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the
Commission will act in accordance with its statutory obligations.47
Things began to change in the 1960s, thanks largely to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,
the influential appellate court that handles the lion’s share of administrative law
litigation. At a time when agencies were increasingly turning to notice-and-comment
rulemaking as a policy-making tool,48 the judges of the D.C. Circuit began ratcheting up
the scrutiny paid to agency choices through increasingly stringent application of arbitrary
and capricious review. This more aggressive form of arbitrary and capricious review
became known as “hard look” review.
The name “hard look review” is itself instructive, if often misunderstood. Many assume
that it refers to the court’s vigorous scrutiny of the agency, but the phrase originated to
describe the kind of close attention an agency must give to the issues at hand.49 To quote
from the seminal opinion, authored by Judge Harold Leventhal,
Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in case
of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative
charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a
combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a “hard

47

ibid 224-25.
Reuel E Schiller, ‘Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the
1960s and 1970s,’ (2001) 53 Admin L Rev 1139.
49
Nat’l Lime Assoc v EPA, 627 F 2d 416, 451 n 126 (DC Cir 1980).
48
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look” at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned
decision-making.50
For much of the 1970s, some judges on the D.C. Circuit took the view that reviewing
courts should prescribe additional procedures, such as hearings, to remedy agencies’
failures to consider issues thoroughly.51 The Supreme Court put an end to this practice in
the 1978 Vermont Yankee case,52 which held that courts may not impose procedural
requirements not contained in the APA. But even when courts do not mandate specific
procedures for agencies to follow, hard look review often casts substantive review in
procedural terms. It is not the agency’s policy choices that are themselves inherently
arbitrary and capricious; rather, what is arbitrary and capricious is the agency’s failure to
justify its choices adequately in the face of the totality of the arguments and evidence
before it. The agency is faulted not so much for its decision as for how it came to its
decision. For a better sense of classical hard look review in action, we begin with a closer
look at one of the D.C. Circuit’s cases, National Tire Dealers and Retreaders
Association, Inc. v. Brinegar.53
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The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act of 1966 grants the Secretary of
Transportation the authority to “establish by order appropriate Federal motor vehicle
safety standards.”54 The statute requires that each standard “shall be practicable, shall
meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms.”55 In
addition, the Act imposes the duty to establish standards on some specific matters. It
50
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specifies, among other things, that all safety standards for tires “shall require that tires . . .
be permanently and conspicuously labeled with such safety information as [the Secretary]
determines to be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.”56 The statute further
requires that tire labels shall include, at a minimum, the number of plies in a tire, the
maximum permissible load, and certain other information.
The agency promulgated by regulation a tire safety standard in 1972. The regulation
required that all retreaded passenger tires be permanently molded with the ply and load
information specifically required by the statute, as well as the tire size, maximum
inflation, and the words “tubeless” or “tube-type” and “belted” or “radial,” as applicable.
The standard was challenged by a trade association of tire dealers and retreaders.
Specifically, the challengers denied that the agency had demonstrated that the needs of
motor vehicle safety could only be met through a permanent label containing the
specified information.57
The court noted that a permanent label was plainly not necessary to protect the original
purchaser of retreaded tires, who could equally well be informed by a nonpermanent,
affixed label at the point of sale. But, as the court acknowledged, the agency justified the
requirement of a permanent label with reference to used retreaded tires. The preamble to
the standard stated:
Tires . . . . may be subject to many applications during their useful life.
They are transferred from wheel to wheel and from vehicle to vehicle, and
each time this takes place the information on the tire sidewall becomes
important. Permanent labeling is therefore required if the information is to
perform its function, as it can be readily assumed that affixed labels will
last little longer than the first time the tire is mounted.58
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Still, the court argued, this did not go far enough to justify requiring permanent labels:
“The Secretary has supplied no illustrations or references to the record to amplify these
observations.”59 The court itself imagined two scenarios in which the lack of a permanent
label could impair safety: when an original purchaser of retreaded tires needed to replace
one or more with matching tires, and when a driver wishes to purchase used retreaded
tires for his vehicle. Still, according to the court, the agency had not provided sufficient
information to justify the conclusion that the permanent labeling requirement was
appropriate:
There is no suggestion in the record or briefs of how frequently these
hypothetical situations arise. They might occur so rarely that a costly and
burdensome permanent labeling requirement geared to ensure safety in
such situations is unreasonable. Furthermore, it is not clear that a secondhand purchaser of retreads or an original owner who seeks replacements is
dependent on the tires’ labeling for information necessary to proper
match-ups, inflation, and loading. The Secretary’s brief observes that an
expert can determine many of the critical characteristics of a tire by mere
inspection.60
The court went on to note that the “apparently remote relationship between the permanent
labeling requirement . . . and the goal of motor vehicle safety might be tolerable if those
standards imposed no significant burden on the tire retreading industry.”61 In fact,
however, evidence in the record suggests that permanent labeling would place a heavy
burden on retreaders, and the agency meets this evidence with “mere assertions,
unsupported by any citations to the record, that the requirements are practicable.” To
develop the point, the court proceeded to undertake a deep dive into the mechanics of tire
labeling.
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For approximately 2/3 of the tire casings used by retreaders, the information required by
the standard is not already printed in a location that would be visible after retreading. The
retreading process involves removing the old tire tread, buffing the surface, affixing a
new rubber tread with adhesive, and then vulcanizing it to the casing. To permanently
label tires during this process, according to the court,
“it would be necessary for an employee to work with hand-tools on a mold
that would have a temperature somewhere between 250 and 300 degrees
F. exposing him to the danger of burns in an effort to change the varied
plates with this information on it as each tire is changed in the mold.”
Altering the mold plates in this fashion would be necessary for almost
every tire run through the production lines, since the size, number of plies,
construction, maximum pressure, and other characteristics vary from tire
to tire. Thus, permanent labeling of retreads with the various items
specified in Standard No. 117 might be loosely analogized to
personalizing a set of wedding invitations by engraving each one with the
name of the individual invitee: the engraving plate would have to be
changed for each invitation printed.62
Although the comments “raise serious doubts” about the regulation, the court found the
agency’s response inadequate. The agency noted that manufacturers are already required
to imprint information on each tire they retread under a different regulation, but the court
found that the existing regulation is substantially less onerous, because the information it
requires does not change from tire to tire.
As practiced in National Tire Dealers, hard look review shares substantial similarities to
proportionality review. At the heart of the court’s analysis is what amounts to a necessity
test: to serve the legitimate purpose of promoting motor vehicle safety, is it really
necessary that tires be labeled permanently with this information? In application here, the
test is quite demanding, because the court places the burden of establishing the necessity
of its measure squarely on the shoulders of the agency. In the preamble to the rule, the
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agency articulated a plausible reason why the information needed to be permanently
affixed to the tire—to make the information available after the point of sale to those who
might need it to select or match tires—but this is not enough for the court. The court
further requires the agency to establish that “these hypothetical situations” arise
frequently enough to justify the requirement.
The opinion suggests, however, that the intensity of its necessity analysis is not a constant
but a variable, to be adjusted based on the magnitude of the burden the challenged
measure imposes. As the court notes, the looseness of fit between the permanent labeling
requirement and the goal of auto safety might not be fatal were the challenged measure
less burdensome on tire retreaders. The court seems to be endorsing variable intensity
review, along lines similar to those suggested by some scholars of proportionality.63 This
kind of analysis, which pegs the intensity of necessity review to the burden a challenged
measure imposes, permits the court to roughly balance benefits and harms from the
measure: the greater the burden, the more intensive the review, and therefore, the lower
the measure’s chances of surviving. This approach gives the court a way to consider the
weights of competing interests without engaging in an explicit balancing analysis. This
kind of “stealth balancing” may hold particular appeal to judges in the United States,
where judicial balancing of values can be controversial.64
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The United States Supreme Court hears only a handful of administrative law cases each
term,65 and for more than a decade, it was not clear how the high court would receive the
D.C. Circuit’s experiment with hard look arbitrary and capricious review. The Vermont
Yankee decision of 1978,66 which took appeals courts to task for imposing on agencies
procedural requirements not contained in the APA, suggested to many scholars that the
Court would look with disfavor on the D.C. Circuit’s upgrade to the historically
deferential arbitrary and capricious review. In fact, however, the Supreme Court surprised
many in 1983 with its decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,67 while gave a full-throated endorsement to the
hard look version of arbitrary and capricious review.
Like National Tire Dealers, State Farm concerned a protracted rulemaking process
conducted by the hapless NHTSA, this one involving passenger restraint safety standards.
The Department of Transportation first issued a rule requiring seatbelts in passenger
vehicles in 1967, but seatbelts could only work if worn, and the majority of motorists in
the late 1960s declined to buckle up. In 1969, the agency responded by proposing a
standard requiring passive restraints, which as a practical matter meant either automatic
seatbelts or airbags. After much wrangling, the agency adopted a final rule in 1977,
which required manufacturers to equip all new cars with passive restraints by model year
1984. Then in 1981, the agency reopened the rulemaking process, and after a comment
period, rescinded the passive restraint requirement altogether. An insurance company and
trade association for insurers sued to challenge the rescission as arbitrary and capricious.
They won in the appeals court, and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, an
intervenor in the case, petitioned for review in the Supreme Court.
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Writing for the Court, Justice Byron White laid out the arbitrary and capricious standard
as follows:
The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard is
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a “rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.” In reviewing that
explanation, we must “consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment.” Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.68
The Supreme Court’s decision put the agency’s explanation for changing course squarely
at the center of its analysis. In a statement accompanying the rescission, the agency
explained that new information undermined its earlier projections about the safety
benefits of the passive restraint requirement. Initially, the agency had anticipated that
roughly 60% of vehicles would meet the new requirements with airbags, but as the auto
industry began finalizing its compliance plans, it became clear that around 99% of new
cars would feature automatic seatbelts instead. Moreover, the vast majority of automatic
seatbelts would be detachable belts, which, once detached, would remain disabled until
rebuckled by the motorist. Because detachable belts require “the same kind of affirmative
action that is the stumbling block to obtaining high usage levels of manual belts,”
according to the agency, it was no longer clear that the standard would significantly
increase motor vehicle safety.69
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Justice White subjected the agency’s reasoning to a demanding examination. The Court
took issue not only with how the agency considered the issues, but its failure to consider
all the alternatives. “The first and most obvious reason for finding the rescission arbitrary
and capricious,” according to the Court, “is that NHTSA apparently gave no
consideration whatever to modifying the Standard to require that airbag technology be
utilized.”70 The Court noted that the agency’s original rule proposal would have required
installing airbags in all new cars, and that when an automatic seatbelt option was later
proposed, the use of detachable seatbelts was approved only with manufacturers’
assurances that they would not compromise the standard’s safety goals. The Court stops
short of insisting that the agency should have returned to an all-airbag standard. Rather, if
the agency believed an all-airbag standard was unworkable, it had a duty to explain why:
Given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by the agency, the
mandate of the Act to achieve traffic safety would suggest that the logical
response to the faults of detachable seatbelts would be to require the
installation of airbags. At the very least this alternative way of achieving
the objectives of the Act should have been addressed and adequate reasons
given for its abandonment. But the agency not only did not require
compliance through airbags, it also did not even consider the possibility in
its 1981 rulemaking. Not one sentence of its rulemaking statement
discusses the airbags-only option.71
Although concerns about an airbag-only standard emerged in the briefs and oral
arguments before the Supreme Court, the Court disregarded them, noting that “the courts
may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action.”72
The Court also concluded that the agency was “too quick to dismiss the safety benefits of
automatic seatbelts.”73 The agency dismissed the results of a study showing a substantial
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increase in seatbelt use in vehicles with passive belts, on the grounds that participants in
the study were not typical: they had purchased vehicles with extra safety features not
required by law. The Court accepted that “it is within the agency’s discretion to pass
upon the generalizability of these field studies.”74 However, the Court rejected the train
of reasoning that led the agency to conclude that the use of detachable belts would not
necessarily lead to even a five percentage point increase in seatbelt usage, because the
agency “apparently take no account of the critical difference between detachable
automatic belts and current manual belts.”75 The Court elaborated:
A detached passive belt does require an affirmative act to reconnect it,
but—unlike a manual seatbelt—the passive belt, once reattached, will
continue to function automatically unless again disconnected. Thus,
inertia—a factor which the agency’s own studies have found significant in
explaining the current low usage rates for seatbelts—works in favor of, not
against, use of the protective device. Since 20% to 50% of motorists
currently wear seatbelts on some occasions, there would seem to be
grounds to believe that seatbelt use by occasional users will be
substantially increased by the detachable passive belts. Whether this is in
fact the case is a matter for the agency to decide, but it must bring its
expertise to bear on the question.76
In other words, the Court has a different theory from the agency about how occasional
seatbelt users might respond to detachable belts. While the Court does not assert its own
theory is superior to the agency’s, it does demand that the agency at least consider the
alternate theory and reject it explicitly.
Lastly, the Court found fault with the agency for failing to explain why it had not
required nondetachable automatic belts in the safety standard. Specifically, the Court was
not satisfied with the agency’s reasons for not requiring a continuous passive seatbelt,
which the user can spool out to create the slack necessary to enter and exit the carseat. In
74
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its rule, the agency explained that requiring passive belts with use-compelling features,
such as continuous belts and ignition interlocks (which prevent ignition if the driver’s
belt is not fastened), would be “counterproductive.” The agency noted “a widespread,
latent and irrational fear in many members of the public that they could be trapped by the
seat belt after a crash,” and concluded that “it would be highly inappropriate to impose a
technology which by its very nature could heighten or trigger that concern.”77 Moreover,
the agency added, it “would be unable to find the cause of safety served by imposing any
requirement which would further complicate the extrication of any occupant from his or
her car, as some use-compelling features would.”78
The Court was not satisfied. The agency gave no reasons to justify its conclusion that the
continuous belt option would be popular with the public, as the ignition interlock was.
Nor had the agency cited any grounds for departing from its earlier conclusion that
nondetachable belts with spool releases were no less safe than detachable belts. “While
the agency is entitled to change its view on the acceptability of continuous passive belts,”
the Court concluded, “it is obligated to explain its reasons for doing so.”79
To those familiar with proportionality review, the State Farm decision is notable in
several respects. First, the case does not concern administrative overreaching, as in the
paradigm proportionality case, in which the administration has taken measures that are
excessive in context. Rather, the claim is that the agency has underreached: its regulation
does not go far enough to promote auto safety. This is not so much a matter of the
authorities shooting at sparrows with cannons, in Fritz Fleiner’s memorable phrase, as of
shooting at condors with a peashooter.80 In general, arbitrary and capricious review is
symmetrical in a way that classic proportionality review is not: administrative action is
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subject to challenge, and the agency’s reasons for its choices must stand up to the same
scrutiny, whether the claim is that the agency has done too much or that it has not done
enough.81
That being said, there are doctrines in American administrative law that, as a practical
matter, mean that arbitrary and capricious review is more often available to challenge
agency overreach than agency underreach. First, although American standing doctrines
are fairly liberal by international standards, they are generally more favorable to the
targets of regulation than to the beneficiaries of regulation. The requirement that
plaintiffs suffer an injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent”
can pose obstacles for the advocates of more vigorous regulation in areas where the
benefits of agency action are diffuse.82 Second, notwithstanding the APA’s instance that
the “failure to act” qualifies as agency action, courts are generally very reluctant to
review agencies’ exercise of discretion not to take action., as noted above.83 State Farm is
something of a special case, because the agency had first passed, and then rescinded, a
passive restraint requirement. Had the agency never itself raised the possibility of passive
restraints, it seems unlikely that the courts would have required the agency to mandate
them. All that being said, reviewability doctrines are sufficiently malleable that courts
may permit would-be beneficiaries of regulation to challenge agency inaction as arbitrary
and capricious when they wish to. Notably, in 2007 a narrow majority of the Supreme
Court chose to entertain, and ultimately upheld, the state of Massachusetts’ claim that it
was arbitrary and capricious for the EPA to fail to determine whether greenhouse gas
emissions contribute to global warming.84
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As in proportionality analysis, the agency’s consideration of alternative measures is
relevant to hard look review, but in hard look review, the obligation to consider
alternatives extends farther, because it is not tethered to the question of whether the
chosen measure is excessive. An actor subject to proportionality is required to consider
whether the government’s objective could be equally well pursued using alternative
measures that infringed less on the interests of others. The failure to consider less
restrictive alternatives would be grounds for finding agency action arbitrary and
capricious under hard look review, but so might the failure to consider more effective
alternatives.
Even if the Supreme Court accepted NHTSA’s conclusion that its passive restraint
standard would not significantly improve auto safety, that would not justify the agency’s
rescission under hard look review. Rather, the agency had an obligation to consider an
airbag-only alternative that might be more effective in meeting the statute’s goals.
Significantly, hard look review does not merely impose an obligation to consider
alternatives generated through the notice-and-comment process, although agencies have
an obligation to address these as well.85 Instead, in its contemporaneous explanation of its
policy choices, the agency is responsible for anticipating and responding to alternative
possibilities that a reviewing court might later dream up. In State Farm, it appears that
the possibility of an airbags-only rule was first raised by the Court of Appeals,
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commenters on the agency’s proposal.87
Furthermore, under hard look review as practiced in State Farm, the agency is on the
hook not only for considering alternative policy choices, but alternative empirical
predictions. As described above, NHTSA’s projection that the use of detachable belts
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would not significantly enhance auto safety was based on a prediction about motorist
behavior. The agency assumed that motorists who usually do not use manual belts would
disconnect detachable belts and then leave them disconnected. The Court countered that
even motorists who usually do not use manual belts habitually do buckle up some of the
time, and suggested that such motorists might well end up leaving their automatic buckles
attached. The Court expected the agency to explain why its theory of seatbelt use is more
plausible.
Another factor to mention here is the open-endedness of hard look review. While
proportionality challenges predictably feature some version of the claim that the agency
has used disproportionate measures, under hard look review, an agency’s action is
vulnerable if there is any respect in which it is not rationally justifiable. And given the
plasticity of the arbitrary and capricious challenge, judicial review does not reliably
proceed according to a pre-defined series of tests, as proportionality does. It may be very
difficult for an agency to anticipate all of the faults that an aggrieved person may find
with its actions, not to mention the ways in which the reviewing court may probe its
reasoning.
In these respects, hard look review might appear to be even more demanding than
proportionality review. Indeed, starting in the 1980s, many administrative law scholars
claimed that unduly intensive judicial review was “ossifying” rulemaking, and pointed to
hard look review as a chief culprit.88 Writing about NHTSA, Jerry Mashaw and David
Harfst conclude that “[t]he result of judicial requirements for comprehensive rationality
has been a general suppression of the use of rules.”89 Still, concerns over ossification
seem to have faded over the past decades, perhaps in part because it is by no means clear
88
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that hard look review is still the dominant approach to arbitrary and capricious review, as
discussed further below.90
In another respect, though, hard look review is more forgiving than proportionality
analysis, precisely because of its emphasis on the agency’s reasoning process. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to redeem a measure that has been reviewed on its merits and
deemed disproportionate. By contrast, because hard look review focuses on the agency’s
reasoning, rather than the substance of its action itself, it leaves agencies that fail the test
more latitude to achieve their desired results, if they can only give a better account of
their choices. While some observers are skeptical that the focus on agency’s reasoning is
more than window dressing for judicial judgments about the content of agency choices,
one empirical study suggests that agencies generally do eventually win judicial approval
of policies first announced in rules found to be arbitrary and capricious.91
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How widely is the “hard look” version of arbitrary and capricious review actually
practiced by American courts? A firm answer is not easy to come by, but there are
reasons to expect that State Farm may be an outlier in terms of its intensity of review.
Although the Supreme Court has never repudiated State Farm, Michael Herz noted in
2004 that “the Supreme Court has cited State Farm only twenty-five times since
Rehnquist became Chief Justice [in 1986] and then almost always in a dissent, or only to
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be distinguished, or for a pabulum proposition, or in a mild and revisionist manner.”92
This stands in stark contrast to the Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council
decision, handed down the year after State Farm, which the Supreme Court has cited
favorably scores of times. Chevron, which applies to agency interpretations of statutes,
embodies a more deferential form of scrutiny than the hard look variant of arbitrary and
capricious review, as discussed below.93
The FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. case from 2009 illustrates a more recent, and far
more forgiving, application of arbitrary and capricious review.94 The case played out
against a backdrop of prodigiously profane celebrity appearances on award shows
broadcast on American network television. Cher dropped a choice four-letter word into
her acceptance speech at the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, and Nicole Ritchie used a
few more at the following year’s ceremony. Although federal law prohibits the broadcast
of “obscene, decent, or profane language,” the broadcasters were not initially subject to
penalties, because staff rulings of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had
established a safe harbor for “fleeting expletives”—nonliteral and nonrepetitive
utterances of offensive words. But when Bono used a vulgar intensifier to underline his
excitement over winning an award at the 2003 Golden Globes, the FCC changed course.
Reversing a staff ruling that the Golden Globes broadcast was not indecent, the FCC in
2004 issued an order declaring that fleeting expletives could violate broadcasting laws
and be a basis for penalties. Relying on its Golden Globes order, in 2006 the agency
declared that the 2002 and 2003 Billboard broadcasts also were indecent, but declined to
impose fines. Fox challenged the indecency findings as arbitrary and capricious.
A central issue for the Supreme Court was whether, and how, it was relevant to arbitrary
and capricious analysis that the agency was changing its policy. Writing for a 5-4
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majority on this point, Justice Scalia concluded that the agency’s past position had
limited relevance:
[The agency] need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the
reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it
suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are
good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the
conscious change of course adequately indicates.95
Writing for the four dissenters, Justice Breyer denied that the agency’s switch dictated a
heightened level of scrutiny, but insisted that it was nonetheless relevant to the analysis.
The action that the agency must justify is a change in policy, and so the agency must give
an adequate account of that change. That requires “the agency here to focus upon the
reasons that led the agency to adopt the initial policy, and to explain why it now comes to
a new judgment.”96
The majority wasted little time in concluding that the agency’s new approach to fleeting
expletives was not arbitrary or capricious. According to the Court:
it was certainly reasonable to determine that it made no sense to
distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words,
requiring repetitive use to render only the latter indecent. As the
Commission said with regard to the expletive use of the F-Word, ‘the
word’s power to insult and offend derives from its sexual meaning.’97
Moreover, the agency’s conclusion that a safe harbor for fleeting uses of words would
lead to more widespread use of offensive language was “surely rational (if not
inescapable).”98 The majority’s application of the arbitrary and capricious standard to the
facts of this case consumed all of two pages in the case reporter.
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In a portion of the opinion that commanded only four votes, Justice Scalia dismissed
arguments made in dissent that the FCC, like the Department of Transportation in State
Farm, had failed to address important aspects of the problem before it. Justice Breyer’s
dissent noted that the FCC had initially justified its policy on fleeting expletives to avoid
running afoul of First Amendment protections for free expression. Against that backdrop,
according to Justice Breyer, the agency had not explained why the constitutional calculus
had changed. Justice Scalia, for his part, denied that the agency had any obligation to
perform a constitutional analysis, but pointed out that the agency’s order did justify the
regulation of indecency in general (if not this policy in particular) as constitutional.
Justice Breyer also faulted the agency for failing to consider the policy’s chilling impact
on small broadcasters, who would likely be unable to afford the pricey equipment needed
to “bleep” bad language. The FCC had said nothing about this issue, but Justice Scalia
stepped into the breach with some arguments of his own. Justice Scalia first posits that
the “down-home local guests [on locally produced programming] probably employ
vulgarity less than big-city folks; and small-town stations generally cannot afford or
cannot attract foul-mouthed glitteratae from Hollywood.”99 Moreover, small broadcasters
had little to fear, since the FCC’s order stated that it might be inequitable to penalize
expletives that surface during the live broadcast of a public event, and in any case, the
agency had the discretion to craft appropriate remedies that took account of relevant
circumstances.
Plainly, Fox Television presents a brand of arbitrary and capricious review that is
substantially less searching than the hard look review of National Tire Dealers and State
Farm. The core of the Court’s analysis resembles a fairly casual reasonableness review,
in which the agency’s action is sustained because it is “reasonable” and “rational.” And
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the fact that the agency once rejected the policy it now embraces out of concerns that it
could unduly chill constitutionally-protected expression hardly enters the picture. The
agency is not required to explain why these concerns now hold no sway, and indeed, the
Court itself supplies arguments on the agency’s behalf to fend off the First Amendment
objections. To the extent that Fox Television Stations is the shape of things to come, it
signals a departure from the aggressive scrutiny of hard look review.
The Court’s review in Fox Television is also notably less stringent than proportionality
review. From a proportionality perspective, the central question is whether, in pursuing
its goal of keeping the airwaves free from indecency, the FCC chose a policy that went
too far, and unduly burdened free expression. Framed in this way, the agency’s
justification must focus on explaining why the policy’s adverse impact on free expression
would be limited, and acceptable in light of the gains made in pursuing the statute’s
objective of keeping indecency off the air. The Court’s analysis, by contrast, does not
require the FCC to justify its policy in these terms, or to explain why its choice strikes the
balance between these competing considerations better than alternative approaches.
Indeed, the agency has almost nothing to say on its policy’s impact on expression.
Because the Court stops after evaluating the agency’s policy on its own terms and
pronouncing it reasonable, it never squarely engages with the other interests at stake.

Agency	
  Discretion	
  and	
  Statutory	
  Interpretation	
  
As a practical matter, many of the important discretionary choices that agencies make are
reflected in their interpretations of the statutes that they administer. A formidable body of
law has grown up to address the sort of deference that courts owe to agency
interpretations of statutes under different circumstances. This is not the place for a
comprehensive analysis of these doctrines, but a discussion of judicial control of agency
discretion would be incomplete without some reference to them.
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The centerpiece of the Supreme Court’s deference jurisprudence is the famous Chevron
decision from 1984.100 In Chevron, the Court devised a two-step analysis for evaluating
agency interpretations of statutes:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.101
Chevron is important conceptually not least because it explicitly recognizes agency
statutory interpretation as a means by which agencies exercise discretionary decisionmaking power delegated by Congress. The Court draws a connection between the actions
agencies take pursuant to express grants of discretion, which are subject to arbitrary and
capricious review, and the policy choices agencies make pursuant to implicit delegations
in the form of statutory ambiguities, which are subject to Chevron reasonableness review:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to
an agency on a particular question is implicit, rather than explicit. In such
a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.102
100
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In the Chevron case itself, the key interpretive question concerned the “bubble concept”:
whether the EPA would be permitted to treat an entire industrial facility as a “stationary
source” of pollution for purposes of the pollution permitting regime of the Clean Air Act.
The EPA’s interpretation would allow polluters to modify their facilities without
obtaining new permits so long as total emissions did not rise. Environmental groups
protested that the interpretation would undercut the statute’s goal of pollution reduction,
while the agency maintained its interpretation would encourage facilities to favor
technologies that polluted less. The Court concluded that “Congress did not have a
specific intention on the applicability of the bubble concept in these cases,” and that “the
EPA’s use of that concept here is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.”103
The Court concluded the agency’s choice was reasonable largely because it represented a
“reasonable accommodation” of the competing economic and environmental goals
animating the Clean Air Act.104
As prominent as it is, Chevron does not occupy the whole field of statutory interpretation.
Chevron does not apply to all agency interpretations of statutes, and exactly when it
applies remains a source of some confusion and controversy even now.
In a 2001 case, United States v. Mead Corporation,105 the Supreme Court explained that
Chevron applied whenever “Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with
the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted
law.”106 A congressional grant of rulemaking or formal adjudication power is “a very
good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment,” but it is not dispositive.107 In
the event that an agency interpretation does not merit Chevron review, it will be afforded
103
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the “sliding-scale” deference mandated by Skidmore v. Swift & Co.108 Under Skidmore,
the weight a reviewing court will give to an agency’s interpretation “will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.”109
The mixed deference regime inaugurated by Mead has drawn criticism from some
prominent scholars for providing poor guidance to agencies and lower courts.110 In
particular, it is not obvious how courts are to determine whether Congress would expect
agencies to speak to a given issue with the force of law. The presumption that notice-andcomment rulemakings and formal adjudications are Chevron-eligible turns out not to hold
up in practice, at least as far as the Supreme Court is concerned: an empirical study by
William Eskridge and Lauren Baer finds that, through 2006, the Supreme Court evaluated
only a minority of these statutory interpretations under Chevron or a more deferential
standard.111

A	
  Convergence	
  of	
  Standards?	
  
How does judicial review of agency statutory interpretations compare to arbitrary and
capricious review? There are really two questions here. First, what is the difference
between an agency interpreting a statute and an agency exercising discretion under a
statute? Second, what are the substantive differences, if any, between the standards of
review courts apply in these two situations? The answer to neither question is completely
clear.
108
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In some cases, an agency is clearly either interpreting a statute or exercising discretion,
and of course the parties’ pleading can help to clarify the questions before the court. In
other cases, however, the distinction will not be so obvious, with the result that it is also
not obvious how the court should review the agency’s action. Jack Beermann, for
instance, makes a convincing argument that the Supreme Court could have approached
Fox Television as a statutory interpretation case, the central question being whether the
agency permissibly interpreted the statutes’s prohibition on “obscene, indecent, or
profane language.”112 This would counsel reviewing the agency under the Chevron
framework. In actuality, Chevron is mentioned nowhere in Fox Television’s five
opinions.
The Court faced a choice between these two frameworks directly in Judalung v. Holder,
from 2011.113 This case concerned a Bureau of Immigration Appeals policy restricting
relief from deportation for noncitizen criminals to those who would have had comparable
grounds for relief under a provision of immigration law that had since been repealed.
Arguing on the agency’s behalf, the Solicitor General maintained that the agency’s
“comparable grounds” doctrine was entitled to deference under Chevron step two, as a
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision of federal law. The Court rejected
this contention, and instead reviewed the agency under the arbitrary and capricious
standard. In a footnote, the Court suggested that the choice was immaterial, since the
standards are equivalent: “Were we to apply Chevron, our analysis would be the same,
because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is “‘arbitrary
or capricious in substance.’”114
112
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Judalung was not the only time the Supreme Court has suggested that Chevron step two
reasonableness review is the same as arbitrary and capricious review,115 and a number of
appeals courts have made this claim for years.116 They are joined by some legal scholars
who have also argued that Chevron step two either is, or should be, identical to arbitrary
and capricious review.117 One argument in favor of harmonizing Chevron step two and
arbitrary and capricious review is that is would seem anomalous to subject agencies to
more intensive review for discretionary policy choices than for statutory interpretations—
that is, an intensive hard look review for the former, and a more relaxed reasonableness
review for the latter.118 If substantial deference to the agency is warranted in Chevron
step two because Congress has implicitly left a matter up to the agency to decide, should
not at least as much deference be given when the agency is exercising discretionary
authority that Congress has plainly granted it?
But apart from the question of what courts should be doing, there is the question of what
they are doing. Are arbitrary and capricious review and Chevron step two, as applied by
courts, actually the same thing?
A definitive answer is not in reach, but some empirical data provide tentative grounds for
concluding that they are not. At least as practiced by the Supreme Court, Chevron step
115
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two appears to be a more deferential form of review. According to the data collected by
Eskridge and Baer, of the 54 cases decided between 1984 and 2006 in which the Supreme
Court applied Chevron step two, the Court concluded the agency’s interpretation was
reasonable in 53.119 By way of contrast, in a study of all cases in which actions of the
EPA or National Labor Relations Board are subjected to arbitrariness review in the
appeals courts between 1995 and 2006, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein find that the
agencies won 64% of the time.120 Although these studies involve different courts,
different years, and (in the case of the latter) only a small sample of agencies, they
provide some reason to think that, as actually practiced by courts, Chevron step two
review is substantially less intensive than arbitrary and capricious review.
To the extent that we expect courts to continue to favor the hard look variant of arbitrary
and capricious review, these findings should not come as a surprise. Chevron step two
does not require the agency to demonstrate the superiority of its policy choice to the
alternatives, but courts applying hard look review may well expect such a showing from
agencies. However, to the extent that the Supreme Court has signaled a pullback from the
intensity of hard look review in Fox Television, we may witness something like a
convergence between Chevron step two and arbitrary and capricious review in years to
come.121
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Conclusion	
  
The intricacies and vagaries of American administrative law doctrine, coupled with the
difficulty of reliably assessing empirically what courts are doing in practice, make it
hazardous to generalize about judicial review. Still, as I suggested at the outset, a few
points stand out.
One of these is closely related to the intricacies and vagaries of doctrine: namely, that
judicial review is unpredictable. As this chapter demonstrates, the unpredictability
operates on more than one level. For instance, it is not always clear whether a court will
treat an agency’s exercise of discretion as a policy choice, to be evaluated under the
arbitrary and capricious standard, or as a construction of an ambiguous statute, to be
evaluated within the Mead/Chevron/Skidmore framework. But even assuming that the
court applies the arbitrary and capricious standard, how intensively will it scrutinize the
agency action? Will the court apply hard look review, à la State Farm, or reasonableness
review, à la Fox Television? If, on the other hand, the court treats the agency action as a
statutory interpretation, will it apply the Chevron two-step approach or Skidmore’s
sliding scale of deference? More fundamentally, how do the method and intensity of
review under the different approaches compare? I have argued elsewhere that some forms
of uncertainty in administrative law can have value as levers for shaping agency behavior
under some circumstances.122 But no one, I think, would argue that the level of
unpredictability that pervades American judicial review doctrine is optimally calibrated
to serve any end.
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One consequence of the confusions in judicial review doctrine may be that they create
more space for the play of politics in the judicial review of discretionary decisions by
agencies. To take one example, the Miles and Sunstein study of arbitrariness review cases
notes a statistically significant relationship between the political party of the President
who appoints a judge and how that judge votes. Miles and Sunstein find that Democratic
panels of judges approve liberal agency decisions at higher rates than they approve
conservative agency decisions, and they find the opposite pattern for Republican
panels.123 Doctrinal uncertainty may abet politically-motivated judging, by creating
decision environments in which judges can in fact be guided by policy considerations,
and still credibly claim to find support for their approaches in one or another strand of
doctrine. It may also be the case, of course, that the causal arrow points the other way as
well: that the politics of judging may themselves generate some of the puzzles and
inconsistencies we find in the doctrine.
A second key point is that judicial review in American administrative law is symmetrical
in a way that traditional proportionality review is not. Whether proceeding under the
arbitrary and capricious rubric, Chevron, Skidmore, or a different standard, American
courts can hear claims not only that the agency has adopted measures that infringe too
much on private interests, but also that the agency’s chosen means are not sufficiently
potent to achieve policy objectives. This was the nature of the challenge in State Farm, as
well as in several of the D.C. Circuit’s influential hard look precedents.124 This equal
opportunity scrutiny presents a significant contrast with traditional proportionality
review, the subtests of which are all squarely trained on detecting government overreach.
The symmetry of review may also be among the factors that often make it difficult for
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agencies to anticipate what will transpire in court. Relative to proportionality, the
American approach opens new angles of attack from which parties can challenge agency
choices, and—especially when coupled with the hard look insistence that an agency’s
record comprehensively justifies its choice—can make judicial review a harrowing and
unpredictable experience.
In principle, it makes sense for a judicial review regime to hold agencies to account for
doing too little with their discretionary powers as well as too much. One-sided scrutiny
runs the risk of creating a systematic anti-regulatory bias in judicial review. In practice,
however, it is not entirely clear that the American approach successfully avoids this
result. Ironically, it is possible that penalizing agencies for doing too little gives them an
incentive to do nothing at all. As noted already, it is very difficult in the American system
to obtain judicial review of agency inaction. Shielding agencies from judicial review
when they do nothing, but subjecting them to aggressive scrutiny reversal when they take
discretionary actions they do not go far enough, gives agencies interested in avoiding
judicial reversal an added reason simply not to act at all. This observation feeds into the
broader critique, discussed above, that aggressive judicial review can lead to the
ossification of the rulemaking process. In this context, though, relaxing the scrutiny of
judicial review is not the only option for reducing perverse incentives for agencies not to
act: lowering the barriers to judicial review of agency inaction could also have an effect.
I close with the observation that there is a tendency in American administrative law to
proceduralize substantive review. Even though the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee
stopped courts from imposing on agencies additional procedural requirements, such as
hearings, reviewing courts still have a tendency to describe the faults they find with
agency choices in terms of the agency’s decision-making process. So the Supreme Court
in State Farm does not hold that NHTSA’s failure to impose an airbag-only requirement
was inherently irrational, but instead faults the agency for failing to adequately consider
an airbag-only option.
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The proceduralization of review may serve as a judicial defense mechanism of sorts.
Required to sit in judgment over agencies’ sensitive policy choices, judges would
understandably seek to conduct their review in a way that anticipates and diffuses the
charge that they are simply substituting their own judgment for agencies’. Shifting the
analytic focus from the policy’s merits to the agency’s justification is one way to do this.
One consequence may be to hamper agency action, by requiring agencies to shoulder
burdens of justification that may sometimes verge on the unreasonable. But as noted,
another may be to create more space for second attempts in administrative law. A judicial
remand of agency policy is not necessarily a dead end if agencies can come back to court
with justifications for their policies that pass judicial muster.
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